6 by S |
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A quite common error, I suspect, is to give up too easily. The situation looks hopeless - better to concede now rather than bore everybody stiff by playing the cards to the bitter end, one thinks. But maybe there are possibilities of which, at this moment, one has no conception. Maybe there is a valid squeeze or other type of end-play that will save the day; perhaps there's an unlikely but possible layout of the cards that will allow success; or maybe the opponents, who won't necessarily know precisely what's going on, will take a reasonable though losing course of action. Or of course oppo may simply slip up.
This hand came up recently at a Teams night at the Cambridge Club at Shire Hall.
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At one table I was South and was playing in 4, West having overcalled in clubs. West led
3 to the 8, 9 and my K. I drew trumps
by playing off the Q-J, returned to the A and discovered that I had a heart loser. My 12 easy
tricks had shrunk to 11 - lucky I wasn't in 6! I claimed at this point, cheerfully conceding two
tricks (a heart and a club).
At the other table things were more tense. Here, N/S had
done extremely well to reach the excellent 6 by South on pretty thin values, West having again
overcalled in clubs. West, for our team, led two top clubs,
East following with small cards. Declarer ruffed, drew trumps
with the Q-J and correctly tested the hearts by starting with
the A-K. When West showed out on the second round, the hand
seemed dead and a disgusted declarer simply conceded one
down.
Both declarers should have played on, for they still have
good chances of the extra trick. That innocent-looking 
10 in dummy could be a killer! If West has
all the top clubs (quite possible in view of the bidding) the
double-squeeze will operate for certain. Let's consider what
should have happened at the second table. Declarer should at
the point reached simply cash the Q
and then run the trumps, pitching first the remaining heart
then lastly the 10 (unless this is now
high). In the three-card ending, if West started with all the
top clubs he will be squeezed down to just two diamonds, and
East will then be squeezed in the red suits.
In practice East has the J and
formally the squeeze fails. But closer examination shows that
the defenders are not yet out of the woods. West has a tricky
choice of discards and has to throw all his clubs, keeping his
diamonds - not the other way round, for then East would be
squeezed in the reds. Equally, if East is slightly careless and
prematurely throws the J, this will
resurrect the double-squeeze. How easy is it to see the correct
defence? I think it is quite challenging, for it requires an
ability to foresee and counter single- and double-squeezes -
not trivial stuff at all. And as with so many bridge problems,
the situation initially looks innocuous and the first challenge
is to see that there IS a problem. Surely this is just the sort
of ending that many defenders are likely to muddle.
At my table declarer should, at the point already reached, try a low club from hand, ducking in dummy. This transposes into the same position as at the second table with the same squeeze chances.
[A useful principle when discarding in situations where
both defenders are being squeezed is to try to guard the suit
held on your right rather than the left. This is because you
may later end up discarding after that hand, and a "positional"
squeeze will not work. That principle doesn't help here,
however, and instead the winning strategy is for both defenders
to retain a guard in the suit which has no entries attached to
it. Then in order to exert pressure on the defence declarer has
to kill entries to one hand or another. Note also that if North
held 
10 a "guard squeeze" could work
as when East throws diamonds, West is exposed to a finesse. In
that case the only hope for the defence would be to attack the
entries with diamond leads. But few would lead a diamond as
West! (ed.)]